[PATCH v2] SECURITY.md: Document trusted and untrusted inputs

Carlos O'Donell carlos@redhat.com
Fri Nov 20 15:15:30 GMT 2026


On 11/20/26 8:22 AM, Adhemerval Zanella wrote:
> Recent reports against ldconfig, localedef, message catalog parsing
> and tunables were handled as regular bugs, because only the
> administrator or the user who runs the process controls the input
> that triggers them.  SECURITY.md only says this for ldd, so reporters
> cannot tell in advance how such reports will be classified.

OK.

> 
> Add a section that lists the inputs the library treats as untrusted
> and trusted, with the CVEs that set the precedent.  Extend the ldd
> exception to dynamic loading and ldconfig, and add guidance on
> interface misuse and on proofs of concept that do not go through the
> public interfaces.

OK.

LGTM. You can keep my RB if you accept my one textual change.

Reviewed-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>

> ---
>   SECURITY.md | 127 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 125 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
> index e10e6699525..7f9c5c21f04 100644
> --- a/SECURITY.md
> +++ b/SECURITY.md
> @@ -33,7 +33,20 @@ vulnerability as such.  The following guidelines can help with a decision.
>     exploitable in practice, due to general system instability.
>   * Bugs that crash `nscd` are generally security bugs, except if they can only
>     be triggered by a trusted data source (DNS is not trusted, but NIS and LDAP
> -  probably are).
> +  are).
> +* Bugs that can only be triggered through trusted inputs, such as the system
> +  configuration, are not security bugs.  The section on trusted and untrusted
> +  inputs below gives examples.

OK.

> +* Bugs that only occur when an application breaks the documented interface
> +  are not security bugs.  Examples include passing flag bits that the manual
> +  does not document (some are reserved for internal use), and operations that
> +  ISO C or POSIX leave undefined, such as reading from a stream right after
> +  writing to it without a call to `fflush` or a file positioning function in
> +  between.

OK.

> +* A report should show the problem through the public interfaces of the
> +  library.  A proof of concept that copies library code into a test program,
> +  or calls internal functions with arguments that the library never passes to
> +  them, does not show a vulnerability.

s/show/constitute/g

>   * The [Security Exceptions](#SecurityExceptions) section below describes
>     subsystems for which determining the security status of bugs is especially
>     complicated.
> @@ -49,6 +62,99 @@ the GNU C Library causes a security bug in an application (and the application
>   uses the library in a standard-conforming manner or according to the manual),
>   the GNU C Library bug should be treated as security-relevant.
>   
> +### Trusted and untrusted inputs
> +
> +Whether a bug is a security bug usually depends on who controls the data that
> +triggers it.  The GNU C Library assumes that the system administrator controls
> +the system configuration and the files installed in system locations, and that
> +the user who starts a process controls that process, unless the process runs
> +in secure-execution mode (`AT_SECURE`, for example a set-user-ID or
> +set-group-ID program).  Bugs that only these trusted parties can trigger are
> +not security bugs, even if they cause memory corruption.

Suggest:
"Bugs that only these trusted parties can trigger are not security bugs because
  they do not cross a trust boundary."

Remove the example.

> +
> +The following inputs are untrusted:
> +
> +* Data that applications process on behalf of other parties: network data
> +  (including DNS responses), file contents, and the strings that applications
> +  pass to the library for conversion or parsing (for example to `iconv`, the
> +  `scanf` family or `getaddrinfo`).  This includes the names of character sets,
> +  which applications often take from the documents or messages they process.
> +* The environment of an `AT_SECURE` process.  The library removes or ignores
> +  variables such as `LD_PRELOAD`, `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`, `GLIBC_TUNABLES`,
> +  `GCONV_PATH`, `LOCPATH` and `NLSPATH` in such processes, and a bug that lets
> +  them take effect is a security bug.
> +* The current directory of an `AT_SECURE` process.
> +* The installation path of an `AT_SECURE` process.  That is, the directory in
> +  which the program is installed, and all its parent directories.
> +* The initial open file descriptors of an `AT_SECURE` process.
> +* Locale names, including the values of `LANG`, `LC_ALL`, the other `LC_*`
> +  variables and `LANGUAGE`.  These variables commonly cross trust boundaries
> +  in processes that are not `AT_SECURE`, for example when an SSH server accepts
> +  them from clients, so they are untrusted in every process.
> +* Configuration values that network configuration software commonly copies
> +  from the network, such as the name servers and search domains that a DHCP
> +  or VPN server supplies for `/etc/resolv.conf`.
> +* Fields that unprivileged users may change for their own account, in the
> +  files databases or in identity management services, such as the GECOS
> +  field (with `chfn`), the login shell (with `chsh`) or the password.
> +
> +The following inputs are trusted:
> +
> +* The dynamic loader configuration: `/etc/ld.so.conf` and the files it
> +  includes, `/etc/ld.so.cache`, `/etc/ld.so.preload` and `/etc/tunables.conf`.
> +* Executables and shared objects, including the objects that programs load
> +  with `dlopen`.  The section on shared objects, `ldd` and `ldconfig` below
> +  has more details.
> +* The name service configuration and the databases that the administrator
> +  maintains: `/etc/nsswitch.conf`, the files read by the `files` service (such
> +  as `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/group`, `/etc/hosts` and `/etc/services`),
> +  `/etc/host.conf` and `/etc/nscd.conf`.  The rest of `/etc/resolv.conf`,
> +  apart from the values listed above, is trusted as well.
> +* Data from identity management services such as NIS and Hesiod, or from NSS
> +  modules for services such as LDAP: both its format on the wire and the data
> +  it returns.  Malformed DNS messages are an exception (see below).
> +* Buffer lengths that the kernel reports, for example the return value of a
> +  successful `read` or `write` system call.
> +* The standard installation directories chosen at configure time (`--prefix`,
> +  `--libdir`, `--sysconfdir` and the others).
> +* Locale data: the compiled locales in the system locale directory and locale
> +  archive, and the sources (locale definitions, character maps and repertoire
> +  maps) that `localedef` compiles into them.  `LOCPATH` is ignored in
> +  `AT_SECURE` processes, so a locale loaded through it only affects processes
> +  of the user who sets it, and crafted binary locale files are not a security
> +  issue.
> +* Message catalogs (`.mo` files) used by `gettext` and related functions.
> +  Translations are used as `printf` format strings, so a crafted catalog can
> +  take control of a program regardless of how carefully the library parses it.
> +  Bugs triggered by crafted catalogs are not security bugs, but a bug that lets
> +  untrusted input make a program load a catalog from a location that the
> +  program did not select is a security bug.
> +* The character set conversion configuration: the `gconv-modules` files, the
> +  `gconv-modules.cache` file built by `iconvconfig`, and the conversion
> +  modules.
> +* The input of the tools that build system data, such as `ldconfig`,
> +  `localedef`, `iconvconfig` and `zic`.  Like a compiler, these tools trust
> +  their input, so untrusted input should only be processed in a sandbox.
> +* For a process that is not `AT_SECURE`, anything that only the user who
> +  starts it controls, apart from locale names: the environment (for example
> +  `GLIBC_TUNABLES`, `LD_PRELOAD`, `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`, the `MALLOC_*` variables,
> +  `LOCPATH` and `GCONV_PATH`), the command line and the resource limits.  This
> +  user can already run arbitrary code in the process, for example with
> +  `LD_PRELOAD`.
> +
> +The library treats these files as trusted whatever their ownership and
> +permissions, and does not check them.  If the administrator lets untrusted
> +users modify such a file, or a program points the library at a file or
> +directory that untrusted users can modify (for example with `bindtextdomain`
> +or by running `ldconfig` on it), those users gain the control that the file
> +gives, and this is not a bug in the library.
> +
> +The DNS stub resolver does not authenticate responses.  An attacker who can
> +observe or modify the traffic to the configured name servers can supply
> +arbitrary answers, including Hesiod data, and this is not a bug in the
> +library.  DNS messages themselves are untrusted whatever the query is for, so
> +bugs in the processing of malformed DNS messages are security bugs.
> +
>   ### Security Exceptions
>   
>   It may be especially complicated to determine the security status of bugs in
> @@ -101,10 +207,27 @@ standard-conforming and has races and leaks.  Again, such bugs are only treated
>   as security bugs if applications (as opposed to synthetic test cases) have
>   security exposures due to these bugs.
>   
> -#### Crafted binaries and ldd
> +#### Shared objects, ldd and ldconfig
> +
> +Loading a shared object runs code from it, such as ELF constructors and IFUNC
> +resolvers, so the dynamic loader trusts the objects it loads.  Bugs triggered
> +by crafted executables or shared objects are not security bugs, whether the
> +objects are loaded at startup (through `DT_NEEDED` dependencies, or through
> +`LD_PRELOAD` and `LD_AUDIT` in a process that is not `AT_SECURE`) or with
> +`dlopen`.  A bug that makes an `AT_SECURE` process load an object from a
> +location that the invoking user controls, for example through
> +`LD_LIBRARY_PATH`, `LD_PRELOAD` or `$ORIGIN`, is a security bug.
>   
>   The `ldd` tool is not expected to be used with untrusted executables.
>   
> +The `ldconfig` tool is run by the administrator, usually as root.  Its
> +configuration files and the shared objects in the directories it scans are
> +trusted, including when the `-f`, `-C` or `-r` options point it to another
> +configuration file, cache or root directory.  Crashes, hangs or excessive
> +resource use caused by crafted configuration files or crafted shared objects
> +(for example, malformed ELF notes) are not security bugs.  To run `ldconfig`
> +on a directory tree that untrusted users can modify, use a sandbox.
> +
>   #### Post-exploitation countermeasures
>   
>   Certain features have been added to the library only to make exploitation of


-- 
Cheers,
Carlos.



More information about the Libc-alpha mailing list