[PATCH] SECURITY.md: Document trusted and untrusted inputs

Adhemerval Zanella Netto adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org
Fri Nov 20 13:13:08 GMT 2026



On 20/11/26 05:29, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Adhemerval Zanella:
> 
>> +The following inputs are untrusted:
>> +
>> +* Data that applications process on behalf of other parties: network data
>> +  (including DNS responses), file contents, and the strings that applications
>> +  pass to the library for conversion or parsing (for example to `iconv`, the
>> +  `scanf` family or `getaddrinfo`).  This includes the names of character sets,
>> +  which applications often take from the documents or messages they process.
>> +* The environment of an `AT_SECURE` process.  The library removes or ignores
>> +  variables such as `LD_PRELOAD`, `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`, `GLIBC_TUNABLES`,
>> +  `GCONV_PATH`, `LOCPATH` and `NLSPATH` in such processes, and a bug that lets
>> +  them take effect is a security bug.
> 
> * The current directory of an AT_SECURE process.

Ack, I think CVE-2017-16997 falls in this category. I will add it.

> 
> * The installation path of an AT_SECURE process.  That is, the directory
>   in which the program is installed, and all its parent directories.

Ack, the $ORIGIN in AT_SECURE is expanded mode only as a whole path element, and only
when the result is a trusted directory (CVE-2010-3847, CVE-2011-0536).

> 
> * The initial open file descriptors of an AT_SECURE process.

Ack.

> 
>> +The following inputs are trusted:
>> +
>> +* The dynamic loader configuration: `/etc/ld.so.conf` and the files it
>> +  includes, `/etc/ld.so.cache`, `/etc/ld.so.preload` and `/etc/tunables.conf`.
>> +* Executables and shared objects, including the objects that programs load
>> +  with `dlopen`.  The section on shared objects, `ldd` and `ldconfig` below
>> +  has more details.
>> +* The name service configuration and the databases that the administrator
>> +  maintains: `/etc/nsswitch.conf`, the files read by the `files` service (such
>> +  as `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/group`, `/etc/hosts` and `/etc/services`),
>> +  `/etc/host.conf`, `/etc/nscd.conf`, and directory services such as NIS and
>> +  LDAP.  The rest of `/etc/resolv.conf`, apart from the values listed above,
>> +  is trusted as well.
> 
> It is conceivable that otherwise unprivileged users are allowed to edit
> the GECOS field of their user.  Users are routinely allowed to change
> their passwords.  This applies to the IDM data mentioned below, too.
> 
> I would also add:
> 
> * Data retrieved from IDM services such as NIS and Hesiod is trusted at
>   the protocol level, that is, both the formatting of the data on the
>   wire and the data return is trusted.

Ack.

> 
> And completely unrelated:
> 
> * Information related to buffer length supplied by the kernel, for
>   example the return value of successful read and write system calls.

Ack.

> 
> * Standard system installation directories as specified at configure
>   time (--prefix, --bindir, --libdir etc.).

Ack.

> 
>> +Files are trusted only while untrusted users cannot modify them.  A program
>> +that directs the library to a file or directory that untrusted users can
>> +modify, for example with `bindtextdomain` or by running `ldconfig` on it,
>> +extends its trust to those users.
> 
> I think the first sentence is reversed?  I would say that files are
> still treated as trusted regardless of their file permissions and
> ownership.

Yeah, it is confusing as-is. I will rephrase it.

> 
>> +The DNS stub resolver does not authenticate responses and an attacker who can
>> +observe or modify the traffic to the configured name servers can supply
>> +arbitrary answers, and this is not a bug in the library.  Bugs in the
>> +processing of DNS responses are security bugs.
> 
> This overlaps with the IDM suggestion I made above.  We probably should
> make an exception regarding malformed DNS data.

Ack.

> 
>> +#### Shared objects, ldd and ldconfig
>> +
>> +Loading a shared object runs code from it, such as ELF constructors and IFUNC
>> +resolvers, so the dynamic loader trusts the objects it loads.  Bugs triggered
>> +by crafted executables or shared objects are not security bugs, whether the
>> +objects are loaded at startup (through `DT_NEEDED` dependencies, `LD_PRELOAD`,
>> +or `LD_AUDIR`) or with `dlopen` in a process that is not `AT_SECURE`.  A bug
> 
> LD_AUDIT

Ack.

> 
>> +that makes an `AT_SECURE` process load an object from a location that the
>> +invoking user controls, for example through `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`, `LD_PRELOAD`
>> +or `$ORIGIN`.
> 
> Incomplete setnence.

Ack.

> 
> Overall, these additions are a nice improvement.

Thanks, I will send a v2.

> 
> Thanks,
> Florian



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