[PATCH v2 1/4] CVE-2024-33599: nscd: Stack-based buffer overflow in netgroup cache (bug 31677)
Florian Weimer
fweimer@redhat.com
Wed Apr 24 20:54:27 GMT 2024
Using alloca matches what other caches do. The request length is
bounded by MAXKEYLEN.
---
v2: Added the comment Sid requested. CVE assignment.
nscd/netgroupcache.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/nscd/netgroupcache.c b/nscd/netgroupcache.c
index 0c6e46f15c..f227dc7fa2 100644
--- a/nscd/netgroupcache.c
+++ b/nscd/netgroupcache.c
@@ -502,12 +502,13 @@ addinnetgrX (struct database_dyn *db, int fd, request_header *req,
= (struct indataset *) mempool_alloc (db,
sizeof (*dataset) + req->key_len,
1);
- struct indataset dataset_mem;
bool cacheable = true;
if (__glibc_unlikely (dataset == NULL))
{
cacheable = false;
- dataset = &dataset_mem;
+ /* The alloca is safe because nscd_run_worker verfies that
+ key_len is not larger than MAXKEYLEN. */
+ dataset = alloca (sizeof (*dataset) + req->key_len);
}
datahead_init_pos (&dataset->head, sizeof (*dataset) + req->key_len,
base-commit: f4724843ada64a51d66f65d3199fe431f9d4c254
--
2.44.0
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