[PATCH 0/3] explicit_bzero v5

[Paul Eggert]

On 11/15/2016 09:46 AM, Zack Weinberg wrote:

> in any scenario where the arguments to explicit_bzero are visible to
> malicious code, the adversary has already won.  Those arguments, after
> all, are either in registers or on the stack.  If the adversary can
> read either of those, they can already learn return addresses.


It's possible that the adversary can read the stack but not registers, 
that the object address is already in a register but not in the stack, 
and that the call to explicit_bzero copies the address to the stack, 
making the address visible to the attacker. Perhaps something like the 
following instead?


@strong{Warning:} Calling @code{explicit_bzero} may copy the
the object's address from a register to the stack, thereby exposing
the address to other parts of the program (e.g., another thread),
which may defeat address space layout randomization.