[PATCH] Ignore LD_POINTER_GUARD for set-user-ID/set-group-ID binaries.

[Hector Marco-Gisbert]

I see your point. Unless the "rol" asm operation is also "removed" from mangling 
I cannot see any utility of disabling pointer guard when debugging.
So, let's remove it.


-- Hector.


El 11/10/15 a las 02:10, Mike Frysinger escribió:
> On 09 Oct 2015 21:59, Carlos O'Donell wrote:
>> On 10/08/2015 04:44 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
>>> On 09/05/2015 06:39 PM, Hector Marco-Gisbert wrote:
>>>> A weakness in the dynamic loader have been found, Glibc prior to
>>>> 2.22.90 are affected. The issue is that the LD_POINTER_GUARD in the
>>>> environment is not sanitized allowing local attackers easily to bypass
>>>> the pointer guarding protection on set-user-ID and set-group-ID
>>>> programs.
>>>>
>>>> Details of the weakness:
>>>> http://hmarco.org/bugs/glibc_ptr_mangle_weakness.html
>>>>
>>>> This patch prevents to disable the pointer guarding protection for
>>>> set-user-ID/set-group-ID programs.
>>>>
>>>> For example, executing "LD_POINTER_GUARD=0 /bin/ping" does not disable
>>>> the pointer guarding protection unless it is directly executed by root
>>>> (rUID==eUID).
>>>
>>> Does anyone actually use LD_POINTER_GUARD for debugging?  Maybe we can
>>> simply retire the environment variable instead.
>>
>> I vote we remove it. It has long since passed the point of usefullness.
>> With a proper tunables infrastructure we would have added it in one
>> release while we tested things, and then removed it one or two releases
>> later.
>
> sounds fine to me.  punt it and be done. -mike
>

-- 
Hector Marco-Gisbert @ http://hmarco.org/
Cyber Security Researcher @ http://cybersecurity.upv.es
Universitat Politècnica de València (Spain)