Building consensus over DNSSEC enhancements to glibc.

[Paul Wouters]

On 11/18/2015 11:04 AM, Rich Felker wrote:

> Obviously glibc can't set policy for NetworkManager, but I do not
> think NM should offer such functionality; it's inherently unsafe. I
> would almost say we should go so far as ignoring any 'trusted' flag
> unless the only nameserver is 127.0.0.1, but I can imagine valid
> setups where a virtual network interface with a different address is
> used to route queries to a particular server on the same physical
> host.

If you have a rack of servers you don't want to run a resolver on all of them. You trust the network and the network provides a DNS server.

There are other reasons too for a "trusted network" feature in NM (similar to the Windows "zones" concept really)

For instance to dictate the behaviour of changing the search domains. Yesterday from a cafe, I used "ssh bofh" which ended up getting matched to the hotspot
wildcard record _and_ was running ssh, so I got a big warning about something nasty is happening. But sometimes this functionality is needed. I believe
NM needs to have a setting where a user can "trust" the network. This is not something that we can automate. So when I join the "redhat" network, I should
be able to mark it trusted. When I join starbucks it won't be, even if I had the WPA password to join the network. But this is another problem out of scope for
this discussion. But that is why I believe NM needs this user-driven concept of "trusted network".

Paul