[PATCH v3] Don't allow attackers to inject arbitrary data into stack through LD_DEBUG

[Paul Eggert]

Alex Dowad wrote:

>   	      _dl_error_printf ("\
> warning: debug option `%.*s' unknown; try LD_DEBUG=help\n", (int)len, dl_debug);

Since this patch is about security, I suggest truncating the diagnostic a bit 
less randomly (as the above code will do if len exceeds INT_MAX).  It can cause 
trouble to the user to get gigabyte-long diagnostics, and nothing after the 
first few bytes is helpful for diagnosis anyway.  Plus, while we're at it, the 
indenting should be fixed and we shouldn't quote with grave accent.  Something 
like the attached (untested) patch, perhaps.



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