[RFC] FIPS compliance and other crypt(3) improvements

[Andreas Jaeger]

On Tuesday, September 04, 2012 20:22:22 Alexandre Oliva wrote:
> On Jun  5, 2012, Alexandre Oliva <aoliva@redhat.com> wrote:
> > Me neither.  Exposing any alternate entry point would make room for
> > security-related abuses.
> > 
> > Now, I must confess I'm surprised this FIPS-related restrictions on
> > crypt are being seriously considered for glibc.  I'd have thought
> > we'd privilege POSIX-compliant behavior, pushing FIPS password
> > algorithm rejection to code that uses crypt for actual password
> > checking or modification, rather than for any code that calls crypt
> > for whatever reason (e.g., password crackers).
> > 
> > I've implemented your other suggestions and fixes, thanks!
> 
> Ping?
> 
> I've now updated this patchset (fixed a Makefile conflict and the
> Makefile name in the ChangeLog entry) and pushed to
> lxoliva/crypt-fips-bz811753 (minus ChangeLog entries; they're in git
> logs only).
> 
> Ok for master?

Please post the complete patch set again - and remove the Contributed by 
lines you have in the new files:

+   Contributed by Alexandre Oliva <aoliva@redhat.com>, 2012.

We don't add those anymore for new files.

Thanks,
Andreas
- 
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