RFC: Adding a SECURITY.md document to the Binutils

[Ian Lance Taylor]

On Fri, Apr 14, 2023 at 12:45 PM DJ Delorie <dj@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Ian Lance Taylor via Gdb <gdb@sourceware.org> writes:
> > Compilers and linkers must behave in a reasonable manner when given
> > untrusted input.
>
> Are we confusing trusted with well-behaved?  I mean, if I download a
> source tree from the FSF's git server, I trust it, but it may still be
> ill-behaved.  Meanwhile, sources from a public mailing list may be
> well-behaved but not trusted.
>
> I'm only posting this because Carlos and I had long discussions about
> this before we set up the glibc pre-commit CI.  This process takes
> random patches from the public glibc mailing list, and builds them.
> WHOA!  That's dangerous!  Yes.  The patches may produce well-defined
> code, but are not trusted.  Those builds run in a tight sandbox to
> mitigate any attack attempts.  Security here is outside the scope of the
> build tools.  I don't expect gcc to scan for viruses or prevent people
> from doing "#include </etc/passwd>".

I agree that GCC does not have to scan for viruses or strange #include
statements.

I am saying that you should not need to set up a sandbox merely to
build code.  Clearly if you want to execute untrusted code, some sort
of sandbox is a minimal requirement.  I'm only talking about building
code (and, for objdump and friends, inspecting code).

Ian