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Re: [PATCH] ldd: never run file directly
- From: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat dot com>
- To: Andreas Schwab <schwab at suse dot de>
- Cc: GNU C Library <libc-alpha at sourceware dot org>
- Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 16:21:45 +0200
- Subject: Re: [PATCH] ldd: never run file directly
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On 08/16/2017 04:11 PM, Andreas Schwab wrote:
> On Aug 16 2017, Florian Weimer <email@example.com> wrote:
>> We have this old patch in our packages. I think most distributions use
>> something similar, as a guard against surprises.
>> Can we finally apply this upstream?
>> From 83e5edd390eabe8f8e8e0d051f929b77a30c0767 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> From: Andreas Schwab <firstname.lastname@example.org>
>> Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2011 16:22:52 +0100
>> Subject: [PATCH] ldd: never run file directly
>> * elf/ldd.bash.in: Never run file directly.
> This is BZ #16750, CVE-2009-5064.
Thanks. What about this NEWS entry for it?
+ CVE-2009-5064: The ldd script would sometimes run the program under
+ examination directly, without preventing code execution through the
+ dynamic linker. (The glibc project disputes that this is a security
+ vulnerability; only trusted binaries must be examined using the ldd