Re: [PATCH] Avoid accessing corrupted stack from __stack_chk_fail [BZ #21752]

["H.J. Lu" <hjl dot tools at gmail dot com>]

On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:50 AM, H.J. Lu <hongjiu.lu@intel.com> wrote:
> __libc_argv[0] points to address on stack and __libc_secure_getenv
> accesses environment variables which are on stack.  We should avoid
> accessing stack when stack is corrupted.
>
> This patch also renames function argument in __fortify_fail_abort
> from do_backtrace to need_backtrace to avoid confusion with do_backtrace
> from enum __libc_message_action.
>
> Tested on x86-64 and i686.  OK for master?
>
> H.J.
> ---
>         [BZ #21752]
>         * debug/fortify_fail.c (__fortify_fail_abort): Don't pass down
>         __libc_argv[0] if we aren't doing backtrace.  Rename do_backtrace
>         to need_backtrace.
>         * sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c (__libc_message): Don't call
>         __libc_secure_getenv if we aren't doing backtrace.
> ---
>  debug/fortify_fail.c       | 12 ++++++++----
>  sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
>  2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/debug/fortify_fail.c b/debug/fortify_fail.c
> index c90d384daf..a0777ae570 100644
> --- a/debug/fortify_fail.c
> +++ b/debug/fortify_fail.c
> @@ -24,13 +24,17 @@ extern char **__libc_argv attribute_hidden;
>
>  void
>  __attribute__ ((noreturn)) internal_function
> -__fortify_fail_abort (_Bool do_backtrace, const char *msg)
> +__fortify_fail_abort (_Bool need_backtrace, const char *msg)
>  {
> -  /* The loop is added only to keep gcc happy.  */
> +  /* The loop is added only to keep gcc happy.  Don't pass down
> +     __libc_argv[0] if we aren't doing backtrace since __libc_argv[0]
> +     may point to the corrupted stack.  */
>    while (1)
> -    __libc_message (do_backtrace ? (do_abort | do_backtrace) : do_abort,
> +    __libc_message (need_backtrace ? (do_abort | do_backtrace) : do_abort,
>                     "*** %s ***: %s terminated\n",
> -                   msg, __libc_argv[0] ?: "<unknown>");
> +                   msg,
> +                   (need_backtrace && __libc_argv[0] != NULL
> +                    ? __libc_argv[0] : "<unknown>"));
>  }
>
>  void
> diff --git a/sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c b/sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c
> index 25af8bd413..c9189194dd 100644
> --- a/sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c
> +++ b/sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c
> @@ -75,11 +75,16 @@ __libc_message (enum __libc_message_action action, const char *fmt, ...)
>    FATAL_PREPARE;
>  #endif
>
> -  /* Open a descriptor for /dev/tty unless the user explicitly
> -     requests errors on standard error.  */
> -  const char *on_2 = __libc_secure_getenv ("LIBC_FATAL_STDERR_");
> -  if (on_2 == NULL || *on_2 == '\0')
> -    fd = open_not_cancel_2 (_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY | O_NDELAY);
> +  /* Don't call __libc_secure_getenv if we aren't doing backtrace, which
> +     may access the corrupted stack.  */
> +  if ((action & do_backtrace))
> +    {
> +      /* Open a descriptor for /dev/tty unless the user explicitly
> +        requests errors on standard error.  */
> +      const char *on_2 = __libc_secure_getenv ("LIBC_FATAL_STDERR_");
> +      if (on_2 == NULL || *on_2 == '\0')
> +       fd = open_not_cancel_2 (_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY | O_NDELAY);
> +    }
>
>    if (fd == -1)
>      fd = STDERR_FILENO;
> --
> 2.13.3
>

Any comments, objections?

Glibc should avoid accessing corrupted stack from __fortify_fail_abort,
which somewhat defeats the purpose of -fstack-protector.

-- 
H.J.