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Re: [PATCH][BZ #14771] Fortify tweak for snprintf et al.
- From: "Joseph S. Myers" <joseph at codesourcery dot com>
- To: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat dot com>
- Cc: Rich Felker <dalias at aerifal dot cx>, GNU C Library <libc-alpha at sourceware dot org>
- Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2013 11:58:38 +0000
- Subject: Re: [PATCH][BZ #14771] Fortify tweak for snprintf et al.
- Authentication-results: sourceware.org; auth=none
- References: <52611BBF dot 7000500 at redhat dot com> <20131020024756 dot GH20515 at brightrain dot aerifal dot cx> <5263B1F3 dot 4040808 at redhat dot com> <20131020161449 dot GJ20515 at brightrain dot aerifal dot cx> <5264E67D dot 2060406 at redhat dot com>
On Mon, 21 Oct 2013, Florian Weimer wrote:
> Hmm. There is no up-front check to return EOVERFLOW in glibc, and the GCC
> folder doesn't know about it, either. :-( EOVERFLOW is apparently returned
> only if the actually produced string is at least INT_MAX characters long (this
> is the fprintf etc. behavior).
Apart from the Austin Group response not really engaging with the conflict
with a case that's fully defined in C99, I don't think there's anything
useful for GCC to know about regarding overflows on printf folding - GCC
can't handle strings longer than host INT_MAX (which in practice will be
the same as target INT_MAX for glibc targets) as it uses "int" to record
the length of a STRING_CST (in general, there are many places in GCC using
"int" to store sizes of target objects, host allocations, etc.).
Joseph S. Myers