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Re: [PATCH] ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for future glibc use

From: Ulrich Drepper <drepper at redhat dot com>
To: Arjan van de Ven <arjan at infradead dot org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees dot cook at canonical dot com>, Jakub Jelinek <jakub at redhat dot com>, Roland McGrath <roland at redhat dot com>, linux-kernel at vger dot kernel dot org, libc-alpha at sourceware dot org
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2008 23:25:10 -0700
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for future glibc use
References: <20081001201116.GD12527@outflux.net> <48E3EFD6.2010704@redhat.com> <20081001215657.GH12527@outflux.net> <20081001220948.GC32107@sunsite.ms.mff.cuni.cz> <20081001222706.68E7E1544B4@magilla.localdomain> <20081003001616.GN10632@outflux.net> <20081003004340.GF32682@tyan-ft48-01.lab.bos.redhat.com> <20081003052938.GS10632@outflux.net> <20081002225718.6a0d803a@infradead.org>

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Arjan van de Ven wrote:
> 16 bytes (say 4 vectors) is easier than "variable number of" both on the
> kernel and on the glibc side, and nobody other than maybe Ulrich
> and Jakub wouldn't know what to answer to the KConfig question anyway.

As Roland already wrote, I consider 16 bytes sufficient.  Everything
else will then be served via a PRNG which is seeded through the 16 bytes.

- --
â Ulrich Drepper â Red Hat, Inc. â 444 Castro St â Mountain View, CA â
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Follow-Ups:
- [PATCH] ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for glibc PRNG seeding
  - From: Kees Cook

References:
- randomized stack protector value
  - From: Kees Cook
- Re: randomized stack protector value
  - From: Ulrich Drepper
- Re: randomized stack protector value
  - From: Kees Cook
- Re: randomized stack protector value
  - From: Jakub Jelinek
- Re: randomized stack protector value
  - From: Roland McGrath
- [PATCH] ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for future glibc use
  - From: Kees Cook
- Re: [PATCH] ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for future glibc use
  - From: Jakub Jelinek
- [PATCH] ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for future glibc use
  - From: Kees Cook
- Re: [PATCH] ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for future glibc use
  - From: Arjan van de Ven

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