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Re: Gold Linker Patch: Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715 and in some places called "spectre".
- From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl dot tools at gmail dot com>
- To: Sriraman Tallam <tmsriram at google dot com>
- Cc: Cary Coutant <ccoutant at gmail dot com>, Chandler Carruth <chandlerc at google dot com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat dot com>, binutils <binutils at sourceware dot org>, Reid Kleckner <rnk at google dot com>, Eric Christopher <echristo at google dot com>, Rui Ueyama <ruiu at google dot com>, Brooks Moses <bmoses at google dot com>, Sidney Hummert <shummert at google dot com>, Xinliang David Li <davidxl at google dot com>
- Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 10:22:28 -0800
- Subject: Re: Gold Linker Patch: Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715 and in some places called "spectre".
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- References: <CAAs8HmzJkLiGaUWf9czpNfEejM=uCP=zFvudADEuxsA2wHk+fQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAJimCsGGcXCxQUWD9XGmEHdJ+w01Tr0u29yowA9b16YGHHxMkA@mail.gmail.com> <17cb3295-626f-ba0f-7458-c13eaea24d2b@redhat.com> <CAJimCsE6bZ9VwKTfh9dFvT1HmNb==0Kxh6EJQQWXGoH-U=Epsg@mail.gmail.com> <CAGCO0KhMmBJXuWbb89ZG6tgpVHgmxkE5-xEmMikBjPkVQBDmPA@mail.gmail.com> <CAJimCsFh4c+JgR27i6kVEqexvbfkJJERZ7v7bp6b4JYbR2nUqg@mail.gmail.com> <CAAs8HmyztZxr64OF1q8Vuj=mBeAJXfRS7qssdADDiS5QA3sFpg@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 10:19 AM, Sriraman Tallam via binutils
<binutils@sourceware.org> wrote:
> Hi Cary,
>
> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 3:14 PM, Cary Coutant <ccoutant@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> We aren't patching linkers just because we can. ;]
>>
>> Chandler, if I didn't know you personally, I'd take offense. Hmm,
>> maybe I took a wee bit of offense, even so. :-) Snark isn't going to
>> get you anywhere; it's more likely to close minds.
>>
>> The details of these vulnerabilities are out there now, and your
>> little circle is much bigger. That means you're now exposed to people
>> with different experiences and possibly more expertise. Even if you've
>> already been down certain paths and answered certain questions, you're
>> going to need to do it again for the rest of us. People on this thread
>> are asking reasonable questions, and if you want help and cooperation,
>> those questions deserve serious answers. Together, we may even come up
>> with better solutions.
>>
>> In particular, I'd like to know your answer to Alan's question about
>> the performance implications of deploying slow shared libraries where
>> not all applications need this mitigation, and the suggestion to just
>> compile secure apps statically. I'd like to know your answer to HJ's
>> suggestion to eliminate the PLT altogether (I have an answer to that,
>> but I'd like to know yours).
>
> Let me try to answer some of these questions since these were
> discussed and considered:
>
> * Plain Static linking is going to be a problem since it does not work
> with PIE + static. We have investigated using musl libc to enable
> static linking + PIE and we had somebody who was successfully able to
> link the dynamic relocator within a statlic binary to make PIE work
> but it looks like it is going to be quite a while before this can be
> deployed.
> * We are looking at partially statically linking hot memops to remove
> the PLT + ifunc penalty for these calls. I understand that we may
> still have to rebuild libc.so to use retpoline maybe.
> * Regarding what HJ said, unless I misunderstood, I believe he is
> referring to using fno-plt. We considered that but the problem is the
> indirect jump still exists, but now at the call site. The mitigation
> would still be necessary at the call site as it is still exposed to
> the attack.
Not with GCC using -mindirect-branch=thunk -fno-plt.
--
H.J.