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Fwd: gold: addend issues in

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Sriraman Tallam <>
Date: Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 5:14 PM
Subject: Re: gold: addend issues in
To: Roland McGrath <>, Cary Coutant <>
Cc: "" <>


   Thanks for the detailed analysis.  Please find my comments below.

On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Roland McGrath <> wrote:
> I have a case where trunk gold crashes.  It's a huge case (linking Google
> Chrome) and I don't know off hand how to go about reducing it.  But I've
> isolated the crash to some code where things look all kinds of fishy to me.
> I can describe in detail how things are going wrong, but I don't really
> have any idea what would constitute things going right in this code.
> The crash happens inside get_section_contents in  The scenario is
> that 'str_contents' (meant to be a pointer into section contents) has been
> set to a wildly invalid pointer, and then we get to:
>                       // Use the entsize to determine the length.
>                       buffer.append(reinterpret_cast<const
>                                                      char*>(str_contents),
>                                     entsize);
> so the crash happens inside memcpy inside std::string::append.
> Basically, all of the code inside:
>               // This reloc points to a merge section.  Hash the
>               // contents of this section.
>               if ((secn_flags & elfcpp::SHF_MERGE) != 0
>                   && parameters->target().can_icf_inline_merge_sections())
>                 {
> looks kind of fishy to me.

I am not surprised, the handling of merge sections was tricky and
pretty involved when I was doing this a long time back.  I am
forgetting a lot of the details and like you correctly pointed out
this piece of code atleast can definitely use more input validation.

You have a case where you have a merge section which is not a
SHF_STRING and has negative addends, let me see if I can work
backwards to get a smaller example for this.

> It does various things to calculate 'offset', and then does:
>                   section_size_type secn_len;
>                   const unsigned char* str_contents =
>                   (it_v->first)->section_contents(it_v->second,
>                                                   &secn_len,
>                                                   false) + offset;
> So clearly both 'offset', and 'offset + N' where N is however many bytes
> the code actually fetches from 'str_contents' must be within 'secn_len'.
> But I see a woeful lack of any code that would give me confidence this
> invariant is being maintained.
> As a first sanity check, I inserted:
>                      gold_assert(offset < (long long) secn_len);
> right after the ->section_contents call quoted above.  That alone would
> catch my crasher case (more on that below).  But I wanted to do a little
> more sanity checking and tried:
>                     {
> +                     gold_assert(secn_len >= entsize);
> +                     gold_assert((long long) (secn_len - entsize) >= offset);
>                       // Use the entsize to determine the length.
>                       buffer.append(reinterpret_cast<const
>                                                      char*>(str_contents),
>                                     entsize);
>                     }
> The two gold_assert's there are my additions.  However, the second assert
> fires in cases other than my crasher.  Unless I'm thoroughly confused,
> those cases are wrong too even though they don't crash.  It should never be
> OK to access past str_contents-offset+secn_len, right?

That looks right.
> My case is an i386 link (on an x86_64 host), so addresses and addends and
> everything are 32-bit quantities.  In the case that crashes, the value of
> 'reloc_addend_value' extracted from the section contents is 0xfffffffc.
> This should be interpreted as -4, but:
>                           reloc_addend_value =
>                             read_from_pointer<32>(reloc_addend_ptr);
> extracts it as 32 bits and then zero-extends it to 64 bits.  Naively, I
> want to just sign-extend here.  But that doesn't actually make any sense in
> the context of how this value is used.  Nearby, for the RELA case we have:
>                   unsigned long long addend = it_a->second;
>                   // Ignoring the addend when it is a negative value.  See the
>                   // comments in Merged_symbol_value::Value in object.h.
>                   if (addend < 0xffffff00)
>                     offset = offset + addend;
> I had trouble finding the comment it refers to until I realized that it's
> actually in Merged_symbol_value::value (lower case), the method, not
> Merged_symbol_value::Value (capitalized), which is a type.

Thanks for catching this typo, I will fix it when I send a patch for this.

> I can almost
> follow the logic in that comment, though not quite.  But anyway, it seems
> pretty clear that the same logic for treating addend values should apply in
> both RELA and REL cases.  So I change:
> +                 if (reloc_addend_value < 0xffffff00)
>                     offset = offset + reloc_addend_value;
> and at least the crash goes away.  But I have no idea if things are
> actually coming out correct now.

AFAIU, This looks like the right way to go.  I am not the author of
object.h code from which this was taken but looking at that code it
clearly says that negative addends in merge sections less than -256
should be ignored.  Do the asserts fire even after this fix?

I am on paternity leave right now and trying to look at this in
whatever free time I get.  I should be back to work next week and fix
this with priority.  Will that work?  Cary could I ask you to commit
this one patch to ignore negative addend values for SHT_REL if this is
blocking and I can come back next week and work on a full refactor?


> If that is the "correct" fix, then I think it would certainly be cleaner to
> separate this logic from the collection of the addend value.  Collecting
> the addend value is done differently for RELA vs REL, but the logic applied
> to that value is the same either way.  But I don't know enough of the
> context here to be confident about how to refactor that correctly.  (Is
> the '*it_addend_size == 0' case for RELA, or something else?  Is there ever
> a case when 'addend' (aka 'it_a->second') is nonzero and '*it_addend_size'
> is also nonzero?)

The switch statement only applies to SHT_REL sections so  REL and RELA
can be separated out.

> To what little extent I understand the context here, I think things being
> wrong in this code is most likely to just cause ICF to miss a folding
> opportunity.  So it might not really be noticed otherwise.  This makes me
> think this whole function needs a careful audit by someone who thoroughly
> understands its context (which I do not).
> What is most troubling to me is that there appears to be no input
> validation being done here at all.  Even if an addend value is not huge
> (e.g. because it's really negative, as in my crasher) then you can't just
> blithely assume that it's a valid offset within the section from which to
> read 'entsize' bytes of data (or worse, a null-terminated string for the
> SHF_STRINGS case).
> Is there someone who groks this code and can tackle this mess?
> Thanks,
> Roland

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