From: Dave Brolley Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2009 16:25:50 +0000 (-0400) Subject: 2009-08-06 Dave Brolley X-Git-Tag: release-1.0~185 X-Git-Url: https://sourceware.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=3c96130fde2f114d0ecca13870ac91b00219cf6c;p=systemtap.git 2009-08-06 Dave Brolley * modverify.c (staprun.h): #include it. (verify_it): Now accepts module data and signature data as arguments. Don't open and read the signature here. Don't read the module here. (verify_module): Now accepts module data as argument. Read the signature once here. * modverify.h (verify_module): Now accepts module data as argument. * staprun.c (main): Don't call check_permissions here. * staprun.h (check_permissions): Prototype removed. * staprun_funcs.c (check_permissions): Now static. Accepts module data as argument. Pass module data to check_signature. (insert_module): Canonicalize the module path early here. Call check_permissions here, passing it the mapped module data. (check_signature): Now accepts module data as argument. Pass the module data to verify_module. (check_path): Use the already-canonicalized module path. --- diff --git a/runtime/staprun/modverify.c b/runtime/staprun/modverify.c index f4b15ac3d..15447279c 100644 --- a/runtime/staprun/modverify.c +++ b/runtime/staprun/modverify.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #include "nsscommon.h" +#include "staprun.h" #include "modverify.h" #include @@ -130,7 +131,11 @@ check_cert_db_permissions (const char *cert_db_path) { return 0; } - rc = 1; /* ok */ + if (! S_ISDIR (info.st_mode)) + { + fprintf (stderr, "Certificate database %s is not a directory.\n", cert_db_path); + return 0; + } /* The owner of the database must be root. */ if (info.st_uid != 0) @@ -139,6 +144,8 @@ check_cert_db_permissions (const char *cert_db_path) { rc = 0; } + rc = 1; /* ok */ + /* Check the database directory access permissions */ if ((info.st_mode & S_IRUSR) == 0) fprintf (stderr, "Certificate database %s should be readable by the owner.\n", cert_db_path); @@ -189,16 +196,75 @@ check_cert_db_permissions (const char *cert_db_path) { } static int -verify_it (const char *inputName, const char *signatureName, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +verify_it (const char *signatureName, const SECItem *signature, + const void *module_data, off_t module_size, + const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) { - unsigned char buffer[4096]; - PRFileInfo info; + VFYContext *vfy; + SECStatus secStatus; + + /* Create a verification context. */ + vfy = VFY_CreateContextDirect (pubKey, signature, SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, + SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, NULL, NULL); + if (! vfy) + { + /* The key does not match the signature. This is not an error. It just + means we are currently trying the wrong certificate/key. i.e. the + module remains untrusted for now. */ + return MODULE_UNTRUSTED; + } + + /* Begin the verification process. */ + secStatus = VFY_Begin(vfy); + if (secStatus != SECSuccess) + { + fprintf (stderr, "Unable to initialize verification context while verifying %s using the signature in %s.\n", + modpath, signatureName); + nssError (); + return MODULE_CHECK_ERROR; + } + + /* Add the data to be verified. */ + secStatus = VFY_Update (vfy, module_data, module_size); + if (secStatus != SECSuccess) + { + fprintf (stderr, "Error while verifying %s using the signature in %s.\n", + modpath, signatureName); + nssError (); + return MODULE_CHECK_ERROR; + } + + /* Complete the verification. */ + secStatus = VFY_End (vfy); + if (secStatus != SECSuccess) { + fprintf (stderr, "Unable to verify the signed module %s. It may have been altered since it was created.\n", + modpath); + nssError (); + return MODULE_ALTERED; + } + + return MODULE_OK; +} + +int verify_module (const char *signatureName, const void *module_data, + off_t module_size) +{ + const char *dbdir = SYSCONFDIR "/systemtap/staprun"; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + SECStatus secStatus; + CERTCertList *certList; + CERTCertListNode *certListNode; + CERTCertificate *cert; PRStatus prStatus; + PRFileInfo info; PRInt32 numBytes; PRFileDesc *local_file_fd; - VFYContext *vfy; SECItem signature; - SECStatus secStatus; + int rc = 0; + + /* Verify the permissions of the certificate database and its files. */ + if (! check_cert_db_permissions (dbdir)) + return MODULE_UNTRUSTED; /* Get the size of the signature file. */ prStatus = PR_GetFileInfo (signatureName, &info); @@ -246,94 +312,6 @@ verify_it (const char *inputName, const char *signatureName, SECKEYPublicKey *pu /* Done with the signature file. */ PR_Close (local_file_fd); - /* Create a verification context. */ - vfy = VFY_CreateContextDirect (pubKey, & signature, SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, - SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, NULL, NULL); - if (! vfy) - { - /* The key does not match the signature. This is not an error. It just means - we are currently trying the wrong certificate/key. i.e. the module - remains untrusted for now. */ - return MODULE_UNTRUSTED; - } - - /* Begin the verification process. */ - secStatus = VFY_Begin(vfy); - if (secStatus != SECSuccess) - { - fprintf (stderr, "Unable to initialize verification context while verifying %s using the signature in %s.\n", - inputName, signatureName); - nssError (); - return MODULE_CHECK_ERROR; - } - - /* Now read the data and add it to the signature. */ - local_file_fd = PR_Open (inputName, PR_RDONLY, 0); - if (local_file_fd == NULL) - { - fprintf (stderr, "Could not open module file %s.\n", inputName); - nssError (); - return MODULE_CHECK_ERROR; - } - - for (;;) - { - numBytes = PR_Read (local_file_fd, buffer, sizeof (buffer)); - if (numBytes == 0) - break; /* EOF */ - - if (numBytes < 0) - { - fprintf (stderr, "Error reading module file %s.\n", inputName); - nssError (); - return MODULE_CHECK_ERROR; - } - - /* Add the data to the signature. */ - secStatus = VFY_Update (vfy, buffer, numBytes); - if (secStatus != SECSuccess) - { - fprintf (stderr, "Error while verifying module file %s.\n", inputName); - nssError (); - return MODULE_CHECK_ERROR; - } - } - - PR_Close(local_file_fd); - - /* Complete the verification. */ - secStatus = VFY_End (vfy); - if (secStatus != SECSuccess) { - fprintf (stderr, "Unable to verify signed module %s. It may have been altered since it was created.\n", inputName); - nssError (); - return MODULE_ALTERED; - } - - return MODULE_OK; -} - -int verify_module (const char *module_name, const char *signature_name) -{ - const char *dbdir = SYSCONFDIR "/systemtap/staprun"; - SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; - SECStatus secStatus; - CERTCertList *certList; - CERTCertListNode *certListNode; - CERTCertificate *cert; - PRStatus prStatus; - PRFileInfo info; - int rc = 0; - - /* Look for the certificate database. If it's not there, it's not an error, it - just means that the module can't be verified. */ - prStatus = PR_GetFileInfo (dbdir, &info); - if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS || info.type != PR_FILE_DIRECTORY) - return MODULE_UNTRUSTED; - - /* Verify the permissions of the certificate database and its files. */ - if (! check_cert_db_permissions (dbdir)) - return MODULE_UNTRUSTED; - /* Call the NSPR initialization routines. */ PR_Init (PR_SYSTEM_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 1); @@ -373,7 +351,7 @@ int verify_module (const char *module_name, const char *signature_name) } /* Verify the file. */ - rc = verify_it (module_name, signature_name, pubKey); + rc = verify_it (signatureName, & signature, module_data, module_size, pubKey); if (rc == MODULE_OK || rc == MODULE_ALTERED || rc == MODULE_CHECK_ERROR) break; /* resolved or error */ } diff --git a/runtime/staprun/modverify.h b/runtime/staprun/modverify.h index 49b90bfee..730a5e865 100644 --- a/runtime/staprun/modverify.h +++ b/runtime/staprun/modverify.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -int verify_module (const char *module_name, const char *signature_name); +int verify_module (const char *signature_name, const void *module_data, off_t module_size); /* return codes for verify_module. */ #define MODULE_OK 1 diff --git a/runtime/staprun/staprun.c b/runtime/staprun/staprun.c index 554eecc8d..c64bf5b30 100644 --- a/runtime/staprun/staprun.c +++ b/runtime/staprun/staprun.c @@ -303,9 +303,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) exit(1); } - if (check_permissions() != 1) - usage(argv[0]); - if (init_staprun()) exit(1); diff --git a/runtime/staprun/staprun.h b/runtime/staprun/staprun.h index 0a1ca8852..1dcfabbe4 100644 --- a/runtime/staprun/staprun.h +++ b/runtime/staprun/staprun.h @@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ const char *moderror(int err); int insert_module(const char *path, const char *special_options, char **options); int mountfs(void); -int check_permissions(void); void start_symbol_thread(void); void stop_symbol_thread(void); diff --git a/runtime/staprun/staprun_funcs.c b/runtime/staprun/staprun_funcs.c index 1bbb59f52..4e525b006 100644 --- a/runtime/staprun/staprun_funcs.c +++ b/runtime/staprun/staprun_funcs.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include extern long init_module(void *, unsigned long, const char *); +static int check_permissions(const void *, off_t); /* Module errors get translated. */ const char *moderror(int err) @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ int insert_module(const char *path, const char *special_options, char **options) void *file; char *opts; int fd, saved_errno; + char module_realpath[PATH_MAX]; struct stat sbuf; dbug(2, "inserting module\n"); @@ -71,8 +73,24 @@ int insert_module(const char *path, const char *special_options, char **options) } dbug(2, "module options: %s\n", opts); - /* Open the module file. */ - fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); + /* Use realpath() to canonicalize the module path. */ + if (realpath(modpath, module_realpath) == NULL) { + perr("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", modpath); + return -1; + } + + /* Overwrite the modpath with the canonicalized one, to defeat + a possible race between path and signature checking below and, + somewhat later, module loading. */ + modpath = strdup (module_realpath); + if (modpath == NULL) { + _perr("allocating memory failed"); + exit (1); + } + + /* Open the module file. Work with the open file descriptor from this + point on to avoid TOCTOU problems. */ + fd = open(modpath, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) { perr("Error opening '%s'", path); return -1; @@ -94,6 +112,11 @@ int insert_module(const char *path, const char *special_options, char **options) return -1; } + /* Check whether this module can be loaded by the current user. */ + ret = check_permissions (file, sbuf.st_size); + if (ret != 1) + return -1; + STAP_PROBE1(staprun, insert__module, path); /* Actually insert the module */ ret = init_module(file, sbuf.st_size, opts); @@ -216,28 +239,22 @@ int mountfs(void) * Returns: -1 on errors, 0 on failure, 1 on success. */ static int -check_signature(void) +check_signature(const void *module_data, off_t module_size) { - char module_realpath[PATH_MAX]; char signature_realpath[PATH_MAX]; int rc; dbug(2, "checking signature for %s\n", modpath); - /* Use realpath() to canonicalize the module path. */ - if (realpath(modpath, module_realpath) == NULL) { - perr("Unable to canonicalize module path \"%s\"", modpath); - return MODULE_CHECK_ERROR; - } - - /* Now add the .sgn suffix to get the signature file name. */ - if (strlen (module_realpath) > PATH_MAX - 4) { - err("Path \"%s\" is too long.", modpath); - return MODULE_CHECK_ERROR; + /* Add the .sgn suffix to the canonicalized module path to get the signature + file path. */ + if (strlen (modpath) >= PATH_MAX - 4) { + err("Path \"%s.sgn\" is too long.", modpath); + return -1; } - sprintf (signature_realpath, "%s.sgn", module_realpath); + sprintf (signature_realpath, "%s.sgn", modpath); - rc = verify_module (module_realpath, signature_realpath); + rc = verify_module (signature_realpath, module_data, module_size); dbug(2, "verify_module returns %d\n", rc); @@ -255,11 +272,10 @@ check_signature(void) static int check_path(void) { - struct utsname utsbuf; - struct stat sb; char staplib_dir_path[PATH_MAX]; char staplib_dir_realpath[PATH_MAX]; - char module_realpath[PATH_MAX]; + struct utsname utsbuf; + struct stat sb; /* First, we need to figure out what the kernel * version is and build the '/lib/modules/KVER/systemtap' path. */ @@ -308,21 +324,6 @@ check_path(void) return -1; } - /* Use realpath() to canonicalize the module path. */ - if (realpath(modpath, module_realpath) == NULL) { - perr("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", modpath); - return -1; - } - - /* Overwrite the modpath with the canonicalized one, to defeat - a possible race between path checking below and somewhat later - module loading. */ - modpath = strdup (module_realpath); - if (modpath == NULL) { - _perr("allocating memory failed"); - exit (1); - } - /* To make sure the user can't specify something like * /lib/modules/`uname -r`/systemtapmod.ko, put a '/' on the * end of staplib_dir_realpath. */ @@ -334,8 +335,8 @@ check_path(void) } /* Now we've got two canonicalized paths. Make sure - * module_realpath starts with staplib_dir_realpath. */ - if (strncmp(staplib_dir_realpath, module_realpath, + * modpath starts with staplib_dir_realpath. */ + if (strncmp(staplib_dir_realpath, modpath, strlen(staplib_dir_realpath)) != 0) { err("ERROR: Members of the \"stapusr\" group can only use modules within\n" " the \"%s\" directory.\n" @@ -347,7 +348,7 @@ check_path(void) } /* - * Check the user's group membership. Is he allowed to run staprun (or is + * Check the user's group membership. * * o members of stapdev can do anything * o members of stapusr can load modules from /lib/modules/KVER/systemtap @@ -433,8 +434,8 @@ check_groups (void) } /* - * Check the user's permissions. Is he allowed to run staprun (or is - * he limited to "blessed" modules)? + * Check the user's permissions. Is he allowed to run staprun, or is + * he limited to "blessed" modules? * * There are several levels of possible permission: * @@ -447,15 +448,15 @@ check_groups (void) * * Returns: -1 on errors, 0 on failure, 1 on success. */ -int check_permissions(void) +int check_permissions(const void *module_data, off_t module_size) { int check_groups_rc; int check_signature_rc = 0; -#if HAVE_NSS +#if HAVE_NSS /* Attempt to verify the module against its signature. Return failure if the module has been tampered with (altered). */ - check_signature_rc = check_signature (); + check_signature_rc = check_signature (module_data, module_size); if (check_signature_rc == MODULE_ALTERED) return 0; #endif @@ -483,7 +484,7 @@ int check_permissions(void) return 1; /* The user is an ordinary user. If the module has been signed with - * a "blessed" certificate and private key, then we will load it for + * an authorized certificate and private key, then we will load it for * anyone. */ #if HAVE_NSS if (check_signature_rc == MODULE_OK)