Re: patch 2/2 debuginfod server etc.

[Mark Wielaard <mark at klomp dot org>]

On Tue, 2019-11-19 at 16:15 -0500, Frank Ch. Eigler wrote:
> Hi -
> 
> 
> > [...] What I want is simply make it easy for the user to say where
> > they expect the sources are. So there is no surprises.
> 
> If this were a mandate, it would be a hassle, for any build that's
> more than one directory wide.

It wouldn't be mandatory. It just wouldn't be the default.

> > > The compiled-in default for the binary is off.  The systemd service
> > > default, it happens to be on, but it's configured to serve only
> > > privileged directories that people with bad compilers cannot sneak
> > > binaries into.  People running personal servers can/should use -F as
> > > they see fit.  In the context of a normal workgroup - it's fine.
> > 
> > So -F seems fine for the later, just not for the former.
> 
> IMHO, even the former seems okay and even desirable:
> 
>     debuginfod -F /usr/lib/debug
> 
> is a safe & easy way to relay the contents of all the debuginfo rpms
> that were installed, to nearby clients.  All those binaries come from
> packages/distros, so are at least as high quality & trustworthiness as
> the user's own.  Again I offer to do an audit of some distro debuginfo
> that all their source refs are milquetoast like /usr/include or
> /usr/src/debug.

Sure, you could use that if you wanted to share your whole build/source
trees and don't mind serving any other files on some local network. I
just think it shouldn't be the default. If you go look for odd paths in
.debug files you probably will find them. We already know some builds
generate and/or build files in /tmp or outside the src/builddir.

I'll look to see what is necessary to make sure none of those leak out
by default.

> > > System certs do not serve to authenticate clients.  Client
> > > certificates are per-user things that come with their own management
> > > headaches.  Will think about authentication matters in the future.
> > 
> > I thought ca-certificates.crt were normally used to authenticate
> > remote servers.
> 
> ca-certificates.crt types of files (or /usr/share/pki/ files) are the
> trust roots for validating the *servers'* certificates.  They are
> generally provided by the distro, so can't possibly serve as unique
> *client* authentication.

I think we are talking past each other here. I am not really interested
in "client certificates". I am simply interested in knowing what is
done for outgoing https connections to be authenticated. What would it
take to use the trust roots for validating the server certificates?

Thanks,

Mark