Re: patch 2/2 debuginfod server etc.

["Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche at redhat dot com>]

Hi -


> [...] What I want is simply make it easy for the user to say where
> they expect the sources are. So there is no surprises.

If this were a mandate, it would be a hassle, for any build that's
more than one directory wide.


> > The -F mode is suitable for sharing build trees.  By definition, the
> > content is going to be up to the runtime whims of the system, because
> > even non-/usr/include files may change between one build and the next.
> > This is okay, it is just like running gdb on an older binary when the
> > source trees have changed.  (We even propagate mtimes to the client,
> > so gdb can notice it the same way as if it were local.)
> 
> -F mode does indeed seem suitable for sharing local build trees.  If
> we add a big warning about it possibly sharing all local files.

OK, will add a cautionary blurb to the man page.


> > The compiled-in default for the binary is off.  The systemd service
> > default, it happens to be on, but it's configured to serve only
> > privileged directories that people with bad compilers cannot sneak
> > binaries into.  People running personal servers can/should use -F as
> > they see fit.  In the context of a normal workgroup - it's fine.
> 
> So -F seems fine for the later, just not for the former.

IMHO, even the former seems okay and even desirable:

    debuginfod -F /usr/lib/debug

is a safe & easy way to relay the contents of all the debuginfo rpms
that were installed, to nearby clients.  All those binaries come from
packages/distros, so are at least as high quality & trustworthiness as
the user's own.  Again I offer to do an audit of some distro debuginfo
that all their source refs are milquetoast like /usr/include or
/usr/src/debug.


> > System certs do not serve to authenticate clients.  Client
> > certificates are per-user things that come with their own management
> > headaches.  Will think about authentication matters in the future.
> 
> I thought ca-certificates.crt were normally used to authenticate
> remote servers.

ca-certificates.crt types of files (or /usr/share/pki/ files) are the
trust roots for validating the *servers'* certificates.  They are
generally provided by the distro, so can't possibly serve as unique
*client* authentication.


- FChE