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On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 21:11, Chris January wrote: > > >>>*Updated* packages are trusted by default. They can be uploaded w/o > > >>>review. > > >>> > > >>> > > >Not being funny, but this probably shouldn't be the case. I could easily > > >spoof some mail headers and get a compromised binary uploaded. > > > > > Then I suggest you (and other that find in this a security problem) to > > comment my latest RFC (23/09 13:54 CEST) which tried to resurrect the > > old thread about using GPG for developers ;-) > There is also the problem that original binaries form new contributors may > be compromised. They might sign their e-mail with their GPG key and have it > trusted by someone else, but what if I've engineered a binary to go off a > month after my post to do something nasty? Then we know who did it. :]. Thats all we can ask for anyway, unless we want an auto-build system, and then who validates that? See the classic 'reflections on trust' paper/speech anyway. This is a *hard* problem to solve 'completely'. What parts are important to us, and why? IMO: * official packages are not supplanted by 3rd party sites with bad versions (for example, binutils from kde-cygwin should not overwrite binutils from cygwin without telling the user). * Corrina, Chris and I should be confident that what someone emails to the list as a ready-to-upload package is indeed from the maintainer. Thats about it. Rob
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