Bug 7065

Summary: Support building glibc with -fstack-protector or -fstack-protector-all
Product: glibc Reporter: Nix <nix>
Component: buildAssignee: Not yet assigned to anyone <unassigned>
Status: REOPENED ---    
Severity: enhancement CC: aj, atoth, carlos, glibc-bugs, jyasskin, toolchain, xake, zorry
Priority: P2    
Version: unspecified   
Target Milestone: ---   
Host: i686-pc-linux-gnu Target: i686-pc-linux-gnu
Build: i686-pc-linux-gnu Last reconfirmed:
Attachments: stack protector support for glibc
stack protector support against eglibc 2.13.

Description Nix 2008-12-04 00:38:31 UTC
Several distributions, including Gentoo, have patches which attempt to make 
glibc build when compiled with -fstack-protector. None of them that I have 
found actually work: at best, they make it crash instantly, because none of 
them suppress generation of stack guards around functions called before the 
guard is initialized (or even before ld-linux.so.2 has relocated itself).

For now I'd consider it more of a maintenance burden than it's worth to
isolate the parts of ld.so that are called before security_init(), so
I've just arranged to avoid using the stack-protector in ld.so, and
marked the few things not also in the dynamic loader which are used
during pre-guard-init static library initialization with
-fno-stack-protector. (An improvement might be to mark these with
-fno-stack-protector only when building the static library.)

I can't think of a way to isolate the functions in this set automatically, but 
if you get it wrong it's easy to tell because you get an instant coredump, so 
it's easy to prevent the set of -fno-stack-protectored functions from 
bitrotting, manually maintained though it must be.)

You can still use -fstack-protector-all in all the rest of glibc, which
is an order of magnitude more code than ld.so and includes really hairy
stuff like malloc() and lots of functions that themselves call
string-manipulation functions, so I'd say this is a pretty good
tradeoff.

Some of the module tests need adjustment: they don't link against
libc, so must specify -fno-stack-protector; the same is true of some of the 
configury, taking care not to specify that unless GCC is actually capable of 
accepting -fstack-protector. (We specify -lssp and leave the stack protector on 
where possible in configure tests.)

Results of tests and patch against glibc 2.9 following shortly.
Comment 1 Ulrich Drepper 2008-12-04 00:44:36 UTC
Never going to happen.
Comment 2 Nix 2008-12-04 00:53:50 UTC
test environment: 2.6.27.7 kernel+headers, glibc 2.8, GCC 4.3.3 20081121 
(prerelease), binutils 2.19.

config flags (my standard set for this machine):

/usr/packages/glibc/2.9/configure --prefix=/usr --enable-shared \
    --enable-profile --disable-bounded --enable-bind-now        \
    --enable-add-ons=nptl,libidn --enable-kernel=2.6.25         \
    --enable-check-abi=warn --enable-omitfp                     \
    --enable-stackguard-randomization TIMEOUTFACTOR=5

Below, PASS means 'baseline test failures only'. (I also compared
configure output to verify that -fstack-protector addition did not
change the results of any configure tests, and verified that the
appropriate -fstack-protector actually appeared in gcc commandlines at
the appropriate times.)

baseline:                              PASS, by definition
patch applied, no flags specified:     PASS
-fstack-protector in CFLAGS:           PASS
-fstack-protector-all in CFLAGS:       one failure due to #7066, buffer overrun
--without-stack-protector:             PASS
--with-stack-protector:                PASS
--with-stack-protector=all:            one failure due to #7066, buffer overrun

Test failures for baseline (unpatched):

math/test-ildoubl.out:

testing long double (inline functions)
Failure: Test: expm1 (1) == M_El - 1.0
Result:
 is:          1.71828182845904523532e+00   0xd.bf0a8b14576953500000p-3
 should be:   1.71828182845904523543e+00   0xd.bf0a8b14576953600000p-3
 difference:  1.08420217248550443401e-19   0x8.00000000000000000000p-66
 ulp       :  1.0000
 max.ulp   :  0.0000
Maximal error of `expm1'
 is      : 1 ulp
 accepted: 0 ulp

Test suite completed:
  3618 test cases plus 3005 tests for exception flags executed.
  2 errors occurred.

elf/check-localplt.out:

--- ../scripts/data/localplt-i386-linux-gnu.data        2006-01-11 
21:06:19.000000000 +0000
+++ -   2008-11-30 20:52:09.962033876 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 libc.so: _Unwind_Find_FDE
+libc.so: __bzero
 libc.so: calloc
 libc.so: free
 libc.so: malloc

(This looks like something missing from localplt-i386-linux-gnu.data to
me, not a bug.)

(Holes in test coverage: not tested with a GCC too old to support
-fstack-protector. Static testing not performed: see #7064.)
Comment 3 Nix 2008-12-04 00:55:44 UTC
Created attachment 3087 [details]
stack protector support for glibc

This is posted at the request of Carlos O'Donell. TBH I don't care if it
doesn't go upstream, although given that it's already found a buffer overrun in
glibc I'd find that surprising. I'm more interested in distros picking it up.

(And 'never going to happen' is a peculiar statement. It has 'happened'. The
patch *exists*.)
Comment 4 Ryan S. Arnold 2008-12-10 17:09:10 UTC
Nix

A failure in elf/check-localplt.out as indicated by a new symbol in
scripts/data/localplt-i386-linux-gnu.data means that libc proper is invoking the
new symbol via the plt when in-fact it should be making a direct invocation to a
libc internal symbol.  There are very few conditions under which this is allowed
(notably those cases where we allow libc functionality to be overridden).

I've looked through the code and it appears that the sunrpc code is the only
relevant code which uses __bzero.  I don't think there's an internal hidden
version of the symbol.  So these calls to __bzero probably shouldn't be there. 
Instead, they should use memset.  Or perhaps that patch which you're using uses
__bzero?

In order to verify, one can look at the symbol table:

objdump -DR libc.so > libc.dis

Search libc.dis for:

__bzero@plt

You should see a plt call stub, e.g.

00016198 <__bzero@plt>:
   16198:       ff a3 0c 00 00 00       jmp    *0xc(%ebx)
   1619e:       68 00 00 00 00          push   $0x0
   161a3:       e9 e0 ff ff ff          jmp    16188 <h_errno+0x16168>

Now search for: "call   16198"

call   16198 <__bzero@plt>

This should bring you to the disassembly of the function which invoked __bzero
via the PLT.  You can then go into the C source file and replace this with a
memset.  Do this for all calls to the address for __bzero.
Comment 5 Ryan S. Arnold 2008-12-10 18:51:38 UTC
Here's a more thorough write-up of the same thing I just posted:

http://sources.redhat.com/glibc/wiki/Testing/Check-localplt

Invocation of __bzero() by the sunrpc code is acceptable since that code is in a
different library than libc.so so access via the PLT is expected.
Comment 6 Nix 2008-12-13 19:02:50 UTC
Nice description, Ryan :)

A lot of the sunrpc code *does* land in libc (all the client code). Notably, 
bindresvport(), clnt_create(), clnt_broadcast(), universal() (called from 
registerrpc() via a callback from svc_register()), svctcp_create(), 
svcudp_bufcreate(), and key_gendes(), _des_crypt() (obviously used for 
DES-encrypted SunRPC), all explicitly call __bzero() and land in libc.

Almost certainly these would use memset() were the SunRPC code not ancient 
Sun-derived gunge with a 1986 copyright date...
Comment 7 Attila Tóth 2008-12-14 11:32:10 UTC
Keep it going, guys.

To Ulrich Drepper:
How do you mean: "Never going to happen."?!

I always keen on people ignoring security measures.

Regards,
Dw.
Comment 8 Robert Connolly 2009-06-04 22:25:35 UTC
I've been using a compromise. Glibc's programs can be compiled 
with -fstack-protector-all, or whatever other options you may want 
(-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2, -fPIE, etc), but not the libraries. I use the configparms 
file and set build-programs=no to build the libraries 
without -fstack-protector, then remove build-programs=no and add 'CFLAGS 
+= -fstack-protector-all' to configparms. No patches needed, test suites pass 
(remove -fstack-protector during the test suite), no crashes.
Comment 9 Nix 2012-02-26 23:37:48 UTC
Created attachment 6248 [details]
stack protector support against eglibc 2.13.

This is the most recent version of this patch, against eglibc 2.13 (because
that happens to be the version I'm using now, as I track Debian's glibc). It
has needed no significant revisions for years, though the recent csu changes in
upstream glibc may necessitate some small revisions.

(The ChangeLog is out of date: I haven't regenerated it since 2008.)
Comment 10 Andreas Jaeger 2012-04-21 12:55:37 UTC
Your change contains two different changes:
* Supporting stack-protector
* A different implementation of chk_fail function

For addition to glibc, I would only look at the stack-protector support. I
suggest you continue discussing this on the libc-alpha list.